Taxpayers Fund F-35s With Outdated Tech

Pentagon’s Super Radar FAILS — Billions Wasted
The Air Force is accepting brand-new F-35 stealth fighters equipped with 20-year-old radar technology because the Pentagon’s advanced “super radar” has hit a brick wall of technical delays, forcing taxpayers to foot the bill for interim aircraft that can’t deliver the cutting-edge capabilities they paid for.

Story Snapshot

F-35 Lot 17 aircraft are being delivered with the legacy AN/APG-81 radar instead of the promised advanced AN/APG-85 due to power and cooling integration failures
The new Gallium Nitride-based APG-85 radar requires 82 kilowatts of power, demanding costly fuselage redesigns and engine upgrades that have stalled Block 4 modernization
Air Force denies jets are “flying blind,” but confirms aircraft rely on data links from other F-35s when operating without full radar capability
The F-35 program’s $2.1 trillion lifecycle cost continues to balloon as retrofit expenses mount and delivery schedules slip

Technical Failures Drive Costly Compromises

The Air Force confirmed in February 2026 that F-35A Lot 17 aircraft are being delivered with the older AN/APG-81 radar system instead of the next-generation AN/APG-85. The advanced radar, developed by Northrop Grumman as the cornerstone of the Block 4 upgrade package, has encountered severe integration challenges tied to its Gallium Nitride technology. The APG-85 demands 82 kilowatts of electrical power, far exceeding the original APG-81’s requirements. This power surge necessitates extensive fuselage modifications, new cooling systems, and engine upgrades that defense contractors have failed to deliver on schedule.

Why the F-35’s New “Super Radar” is Forcing the Air Force to Use 20-Year-Old Techhttps://t.co/y4Cf5bhyPH
— 19FortyFive (@19_forty_five) February 13, 2026

Twenty-Year-Old Technology as Stopgap Solution

The AN/APG-81 radar equipping these interim jets uses Gallium Arsenide-based technology that has been operational since the F-35’s initial deployment around 2015. While the Air Force insists these aircraft can operate effectively through data-link connections with other F-35s in the fleet, this workaround represents a significant capability gap for America’s most expensive weapons system. Defense analysts note that backward compatibility issues prevent simple radar swaps once the APG-85 becomes available, potentially requiring costly retrofit operations. The F-35 Joint Program Office states that Lot 17 aircraft were specifically built to accommodate the APG-85, with deliveries running from 2025 through September 2026.

Block 4 Modernization Hits Another Roadblock

This radar debacle adds to a growing list of F-35 program setbacks that include TR-3 software delays and persistent engine upgrade challenges. The APG-85 was supposed to deliver transformational capabilities against modern threats, including improved detection range, 40 percent greater efficiency, and advanced low probability of intercept features critical for penetrating sophisticated air defense networks. Instead, taxpayers are receiving incomplete aircraft while the Pentagon struggles with fundamental engineering problems that should have been resolved before production commitments. Representative Rob Wittman highlighted the radar’s excessive power requirements and their cascading effects on the entire Block 4 modernization effort during congressional oversight.

Taxpayer Burden Grows as Costs Escalate

The F-35 program’s lifecycle cost estimate has reached $2.1 trillion, and these radar integration failures will drive expenses even higher through retrofit work and extended development timelines. Northrop Grumman continues to market the APG-85 as offering “unparalleled awareness and lethality,” yet the defense industrial base cannot deliver the supporting infrastructure to make this technology operational. This pattern of overpromising and underdelivering exemplifies the wasteful Pentagon acquisition practices that frustrate Americans who demand accountability for their tax dollars. The Air Force maintains that specific integration schedules remain classified, conveniently shielding program managers from public scrutiny while pilots receive degraded equipment and adversaries close the capability gap.